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Introduction
As foundations increasingly embrace the principles of strategic philanthropy — explicit
goals, evidence-based strategies, evaluation of
progress — warnings about the approach have
gained currency. Strategic grantmakers, some
contend, assert the right to set social change
agendas while undervaluing the judgments of
practitioners who are working for change on
a daily basis. They risk treating their grantees
as mere contractors rather than full partners
(Patrizi & Heid Thompson, 2010). And they are
likely to oversimplify highly complex problems,
thus locking their grantees into rigid theories
of change and indicator frameworks that are
insufficiently responsive to dynamic situations
(Patrizi, Heid Thompson, Coffman, & Beer,
2013; Harvey, 2016; Kania, Kramer, & Russell,
2014). Nevertheless, in a field where feedback is
uneven and vast sums of money can easily be
squandered, the reasons for conducting goaldriven, evidence-based grantmaking remain
compelling (Brest & Harvey, 2018).
The challenge for strategic grantmakers is
to reconcile a dilemma at the heart of their
enterprise. They have an obligation — not just
to their founders, but to the public that has
entrusted them with generous tax benefits —
to put their funds to the best possible use and
take full advantage of the unusual freedom
they have to choose where their money goes.
This means pursuing ambitious aims through
84 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Key Points
• Strategic philanthropy requires striking a
balance between two extremes. On one
side is unilateral agenda-setting by the
foundation and excessive reliance on its
own intellectual frameworks and methods.
On the other side is too much deference to
competing voices from the field, with the risk
that funding will be haphazard and incoherent. This article describes how the Delaware
River Watershed Initiative, supported by the
William Penn Foundation, has struggled to
position itself between these two extremes.
• Based on an evaluation conducted during
the first four years of the initiative, the
article examines four interrelated tensions:
upfront planning versus emergent strategy,
top-down versus bottom-up management,
strategic focus versus opportunistic
flexibility, and ambitious aspirations versus
realistic expectations.
• After discussing how each of these tensions
has played out as the initiative has evolved,
the article concludes by suggesting that the
role of evaluation in strategic philanthropy is
not just to provide feedback on the progress
of a strategy, but also to facilitate a learning
process to help participants clarify their
strategy by reconciling such tensions.

carefully formulated courses of action. Yet
their success depends on grantee organizations
that are accountable to their own boards and
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FIGURE 1 The Evaluation Team
• Edward W. Wilson, an evaluation professional with three decades of experience, specializing in the
review of conservation programs.
• David LaRoche, an independent consultant with more than 40 years of experience in watershed project
development, management, and evaluation.
• Paul L. Freedman and Kathy Hall of LimnoTech, a leading environmental engineering and science firm
specializing in water-related issues.
• Matt James and Dave Hubbard of Coastal Restoration Consultants Inc., experts in on-the-ground
stream and wetland restoration projects.
• Carol Bromer, a research specialist with nearly 20 years of experience assessing environmental
programs.
Evaluation activities included:
• In-depth interviews
• Participant observation
• Field and site visits
• Expert reviews of the use of water-quality monitoring and modeling tools
• An online survey of grantees
• Three written reports
• Four presentations to grantees

Strategic grantmakers find themselves teetering
on a narrow edge between hubris and humility. On one side is unilateral agenda-setting
and excessive reliance on their own intellectual frameworks and methods. On the other
side is too much deference to competing voices
from the field, with the risk that funding will
be haphazard and incoherent. The art of strategic philanthropy is to strike the right balance
between these two extremes.
This article examines how the William Penn
Foundation, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, has

endeavored to achieve this balance in its support
for watershed protection and restoration. The
Delaware River Watershed Initiative (DRWI) is a
continuing effort, launched by the foundation in
2014, that has sought to align the efforts of more
than 50 conservation organizations, land trusts,
and research groups toward improving the condition of watersheds in a major East Coast river
basin. Although the foundation had been making
grants in support of watershed restoration and
land preservation since the mid-1990s (Sherman
& Wilson, 2003), the DRWI represented a dramatic shift away from responsive grantmaking,
guided by broad programmatic criteria, toward
a much more strategic approach. Emphasizing
the importance of sound science, the foundation
used data and models to inform the location and
design of on-the-ground land protection and
restoration projects, and invested in an extensive water-quality monitoring program in the
hope of demonstrating the initiative’s effectiveness (Freedman, Arscott, Haag, & Hall, 2018).
A formative evaluation was commissioned to
assess the initiative’s first three-year phase. (See
Table 1.) That evaluation, which is the basis of
this article, contributed to a strategic learning
The Foundation Review // 2019 Vol 11:4 85
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stakeholders and have their own goals that may
not be consistent with those of their funders.
Although the inherent power imbalance in
philanthropy can easily lead foundations to treat
grantees as subordinates, foundations must work
cooperatively and respectfully with grantees for
practical as well as ethical reasons. If they fail to
do so, they may tie the hands of the implementers of their strategies and ignore the knowledge
of those who are laboring in the trenches
(Dowie, 1995, 2001; Delfin & Tang, 2006; Harvey,
2016; Reich, 2018).
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In the DRWI, as in many
other foundation initiatives,
the challenge was not so
much to assess the progress
of the strategy as to clarify
what the strategy was. The
evaluators’ chief contribution
was to facilitate a collaborative
learning process by calling
attention to the various
tensions inherent in the
initiative and encouraging the
William Penn Foundation and
its partners to find ways to
address them.
process the foundation and its partners have
gone through as they have worked to reconcile
four interrelated tensions:
• upfront planning versus emergent strategy,
• top-down versus bottom-up management,
• strategic focus versus opportunistic flexibility, and
• ambitious aspirations versus realistic
expectations.
We will describe how each of these tensions has
played out during the first several years of the
DRWI, and we will conclude by challenging
conventional wisdom among foundations about
the role of evaluation in strategic philanthropy.
Foundations typically have seen evaluation as
a feedback mechanism that tracks progress in
implementing a strategy and alerts them when
corrective action should be taken. In the DRWI,
86 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

as in many other foundation initiatives, the challenge was not so much to assess the progress of
the strategy as to clarify what the strategy was.
The evaluators’ chief contribution was to facilitate a collaborative learning process by calling
attention to the various tensions inherent in the
initiative and encouraging the William Penn
Foundation and its partners to find ways to
address them.

Upfront Planning Versus
Emergent Strategy
Since “strategy” is commonly defined as “a
plan of action” (American Heritage Dictionary
Online, 2019), the existence of a plan or an
explicit theory of change would seem to be an
essential feature of strategic philanthropy. But
strategy-driven grantmaking can go badly awry,
as even some leading exponents of strategic
philanthropy have warned. One question is who
does the planning. Harvey (2016) has noted that
strategic philanthropy “can create delusions of
omniscience in many program officers” (p. 1),
who may well have less experience and hands-on
knowledge of the field than their grantees.
Another question is when and how the planning
is conducted. As Patrizi and colleagues (2013)
have suggested,
Much of the knowledge needed to support strategy
can arise only during implementation. … Although
some dynamics of change in a system might be
“knowable” before strategy launch, much of what
needs to be learned about these dynamics depends
upon actual experience. (p. 55)

The point is not to abandon strategic planning,
but to avoid treating it as solely an upfront exercise conducted unilaterally by the foundation
and ending when implementation begins (Patrizi
& Heid Thompson, 2010).
The DRWI’s experience illustrates some of the
limitations of donor-driven, upfront planning.
An initial planning process by the foundation
and a few experts left key questions unanswered,
leading to confusion among grantees and poor
alignment among various activities. The planning did not end there, however. The strategy
was refined and elaborated as implementation
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TABLE 1 The Eight DRWI Clusters and Brief Descriptions
Cluster Name

The Land and Water

Kirkwood-Cohansey Aquifer

This area, which encompasses portions of New Jersey’s Bayshore
and Pine Barrens, is underlain by the Kirkwood-Cohansey aquifer, an
important source of water for drinking, irrigation, and industrial uses.
Development threatens the aquifer and related surface water resources.

Middle Schuylkill

This cluster comprises areas both east and west of Reading,
Pennsylvania, and is largely rural but includes small urban areas.
Although some of its streams are of high quality, much of the area’s
water resources are impaired by agricultural pollution.

New Jersey Highlands

Providing drinking water for half of New Jersey’s population, this area is
bordered by the Poconos on the north and Kittatinny Ridge on the south,
and spans the nationally significant Appalachian Highlands landscape. It
contains large tracts of forest and many high-quality headwaters.

Pocono-Kittatinny

A largely forested region encompassing the eastern Pocono Mountains.
This cluster encompasses portions of Pennsylvania, New York, and
New Jersey. Though water resources in the region are generally of high
quality, they are threatened by rapid development in some places.

Schuylkill Highlands

Encompassing heavily forested watersheds as well as pastoral and
suburban landscapes, this cluster is located in densely populated Chester
County, Pennsylvania, and includes many high-quality streams, though
water quality is threatened by development.

Upper Lehigh

Located in the western side of Pennsylvania’s Pocono Mountains, this
area consists primarily of largely intact forested headwaters of the Lehigh
River, the Delaware River’s second-largest tributary. Overall water quality
is good but threatened by development.

Upstream Suburban Philadelphia

In this predominantly urbanized landscape west of Philadelphia, water
resources are impaired by heavy groundwater withdrawals, impervious
surfaces that prevent groundwater recharge, and polluted stormwater
runoff.

proceeded, and after four years the ends and
means were more clearly understood and more
widely embraced.
The DRWI’s Upfront Planning Process

The initiative began when foundation staff
partnered with Drexel University’s Academy
of Natural Sciences (ANS) and the Open Space
Institute (OSI) to develop a comprehensive
approach to improving water quality in the

Delaware Basin. Key features of the new strategy included:
• the identification of eight subareas, or
“cluster areas,” within which investments
would yield the greatest impacts, based on
watershed characteristics, threats to water
resources, local organizational capacity,
and other considerations. (See Table 1 and
Figure 2.)
The Foundation Review // 2019 Vol 11:4 87
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Brandywine and Christina

Covering portions of Pennsylvania and Delaware, this suburban and
agricultural region provides drinking water to a half-million people but for
the past 30 years has experienced intense development that adversely
affects forests and water quality.

Wilson, Bromer, and LaRoche
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FIGURE 2 The Delaware River Watershed and the Eight Cluster Areas

88 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Balancing the Competing Demands of Strategic Philanthropy

• “cluster teams” consisting of land trusts,
watershed associations, and other conservation groups working together to develop
implementation plans and on-the-ground
projects within each of the eight clusters.
• two re-grant programs to support capital
projects within the cluster areas. One of
these was for protecting land important
to producing clean and abundant water,
administered by the OSI. The other was
for restoration projects, including stream
restoration, agricultural best management
practices, and “green” infrastructure for
stormwater management, administered by
the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation
(NFWF).
“Building the Airplane While Flying It”

Interviews by the evaluation team midway
through Phase 1 revealed widespread support
within the grantee community for the DRWI’s
central aim — to align the efforts of NGOs to
achieve measurable improvements in water
quality through a science-informed strategy.
Yet there was considerable uncertainty about
what exactly the DRWI was trying to achieve.
Grantees were told that the ability to produce
measurable water-quality impacts would be an

Water-Quality Monitoring Challenges

Another problem was poor alignment between
water-quality monitoring efforts and on-theground land protection and restoration projects.
The DRWI funding included substantial support to the ANS for developing a state-of-the-art
monitoring program. The foundation wanted
to strengthen water-quality monitoring in the
region for several reasons: to support basic
research by the ANS, to engage the public in
volunteer monitoring activities, and to enhance
the ability of local conservation organizations to
gather and use scientific data. The most obvious
reason, however, was to measure the impacts of
the initiative’s watershed improvement efforts.
The program developed by the ANS, which
involved repeated sampling using sophisticated methods at selected sites throughout the
basin (Kroll & Abell, 2015), was well-designed
to characterize the watersheds, establish baseline conditions, and ultimately assess long-term
trends. However, it was not capable of detecting
changes resulting from projects funded by the
The Foundation Review // 2019 Vol 11:4 89
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Although the new approach represented a major
change for both the foundation and the community of grantees it supported, it launched the
initiative quickly in an effort to avoid a disruptive hiatus in the flow of grant dollars, giving
the grantees just a few months in the summer of
2013 to prepare implementation plans for each of
the eight cluster areas. Subsequently, three-year
grants were awarded to the organizations comprising the cluster teams with the understanding
that, given evidence of progress, the initiative
could be supported for as long as 10 years. The
first three-year phase was a period of development and learning as core partners and cluster
organizations forged new working relationships,
began implementing quickly conceived projects,
and negotiated with one another to clarify roles
and expectations. Foundation staff frequently
remarked that they were “building the airplane
while flying it.”

important criterion for project selection, but
the foundation did not specify how large such
impacts were expected to be. When evaluators
asked at what geographical scale projects were
expected to produce measurable impacts and
in what time frame, grantees could not provide
definitive answers. Nearly all were certain, however, that it would be unreasonable to expect
measurable impacts at a large scale — certainly not at the basinwide scale, and perhaps
not even at the scale of cluster areas. As for the
time frame, virtually none of the interviewees
believed that measurable impacts would be evident within the three-year term of the initial set
of grants, and many expressed skepticism about
seeing results by the end of the longer 10-year
time horizon. The evaluators’ observations of
selected projects corroborated this view. The
DRWI participants were left with insufficient
guidance on how to plan future projects, measure progress, and design monitoring plans, and
some grantees wondered whether shortfalls in
meeting possibly unrealistic expectations might
negatively affect prospects for future grant
awards or the entire initiative.

Wilson, Bromer, and LaRoche
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The work of the Institute for
Conservation Leadership (ICL),
which included facilitation
of interactions within cluster
teams and organizing annual
meetings that brought all
partners together, played an
important role in building
these relationships.
DRWI because there had not been enough time
for the ANS to coordinate with cluster teams to
establish sampling sites in areas where projects
would occur. Some members of cluster teams
developed their own monitoring plans with
support from the foundation, but they were
inconsistent in design and not well integrated
with the basinwide ANS monitoring program.
Reflecting and Rethinking

These concerns were raised in an early evaluation report, and the foundation and its key
grantees took them seriously. To clarify goals
and expectations, the decision was made to construct an explicit theory of change. The process
involved the initiative’s core partners, though
other participants had an opportunity to provide input at an initiativewide meeting. The
theory of change provided a useful overview of
the DRWI’s strategic approach, served to clarify
the range of projects and approaches the cluster
organizations could undertake, and led to development of a series of performance measures. But
it left unanswered questions about the size of
the targeted watersheds, the time frame of the
intended changes, and the specific water-quality
improvements that were sought.
Realizing that many important issues had yet to
be resolved, the foundation decided to designate
2017 as a planning year during which partners
would develop clearer policies and guidelines for
90 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Phase 2 of the DRWI. The planning year was in
large part compensation for the initiative’s hasty
launch, which had given grantees little time to
coordinate their work and left them confused
about essential details. Some problems might
have been avoided had the initiative been more
carefully planned at the outset.
On the other hand, a more thorough upfront
planning process might have been premature.
Many of the organizations collaborating at the
cluster level had not worked together previously,
and many of the grantees lacked experience
with the foundation and its core partners. The
relationships needed for a broad, participatory planning process had not yet been forged.
Through the course of Phase 1, the cluster teams
coalesced, cross-cluster contacts were established, and cluster organizations gained greater
familiarity with core partners. The work of the
Institute for Conservation Leadership (ICL),
which included facilitation of interactions within
cluster teams and organizing annual meetings
that brought all partners together, played an
important role in building these relationships. In
addition, enough experience had accumulated
to clarify the issues that needed attention. The
learning acquired during the first three years had
set the stage for a much more robust and inclusive planning process during the fourth year of
the initiative.
Learning the Strategy

The difficult, time-consuming, and sometimes
frustrating process through which the DRWI
elaborated and clarified its approach turned out
to be a good example of emergent strategy. The
upfront planning process sketched the broad
outline of a science-informed approach, but it
left grantees with many questions about how to
implement the strategy in their regions and how
to coordinate their various activities. Through
the course of the first several years, however, the
uncertainties and misalignments became apparent, and the evaluation process helped bring
them to the attention of the foundation and its
core partners.
The foundation and its partners had learned
much about what worked and did not work in
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practice and incorporated that knowledge in a
newly realized strategy, while accepting that the
strategy would continue to evolve. As Henry
Mintzberg, the chief exponent of emergent
strategy in corporate planning, has remarked,
“You don’t plan a strategy, you learn a strategy”
(quoted in Patrizi & Heid Thompson, 2010, p. 54).
By the fourth year of the initiative, the foundation and its grantee partners had learned enough
about the strategy to articulate its goals more
clearly, improve coordination among activities,
and resolve challenges that had become apparent
through the implementation process.

Top-Down Versus
Bottom-Up Management

The approach it chose, however, demanded a
large degree of top-down management. The
foundation’s desire for an overarching strategy
informed by sound science required analysis and
planning by experts and the alignment of efforts
by a large and varied group of grantee organizations, most of whom were accustomed to very
different ways of working. As much as it may
have wanted to organize the initiative from the
bottom up, the foundation and its core partners
could not avoid issuing top-down directives. In
fact, what emerged was a hybrid style of management that began as largely centralized and
top-down but progressed toward greater decentralization as the initiative developed.

that would make up the cluster teams. Driven
by scientific data on watershed characteristics
as well as judgments about local organizational
capacity, these decisions required hard choices
about which of the foundation’s previous grantees would be eligible for continued funding.
Once the cluster teams were formed, however,
the foundation avoided dictating terms to them
— so much so that some of the teams told the
evaluators they preferred clearer directives from
the foundation.
Recognizing the need for improved coordination and communication across all aspects of the
initiative, the foundation added the ICL as a core
partner to help organize and facilitate meetings,
enhance communication within and between
cluster teams, and encourage and facilitate
network-building and participatory decision-making. In addition, the foundation created
a coordinating committee composed of foundation representatives and the four core partners:

Creating a Coordinating Committee

• the ANS, which helped ensure that the best
science and data were employed in the initiative’s design and implementation and in
water-quality monitoring;

Some of the most important top-down decisions were made early on with the definition of
cluster areas and the selection of organizations

• the OSI, which administered a capital
fund for land protection and provided
The Foundation Review // 2019 Vol 11:4 91
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To its credit, the foundation began the DRWI
with a clear understanding of the power dynamics inherent in grantmaking; and its staff,
accustomed to a more responsive mode of
grantmaking, was keen to avoid the appearance
of heavy-handedness. Recognizing that many of
their grantees had relevant scientific expertise as
well as years of experience working with local
landowners and communities, foundation staff
described the DRWI as a bottom-up initiative
in which most of the decision-making authority
would reside with the grantee community.

By the fourth year of the
initiative, the foundation
and its grantee partners
had learned enough about
the strategy to articulate its
goals more clearly, improve
coordination among activities,
and resolve challenges that had
become apparent through the
implementation process.
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Although the initiative
remained largely foundationdriven at the end of its first
phase, there was by that time
more robust buy-in from the
cluster organizations, as
indicated by a survey conducted
by the evaluators, and those
organizations were developing
greater capacities in waterquality monitoring, the use of
watershed models, and other
techniques associated with a
more science-based approach.

point that was noted by the evaluation team.
By the beginning of Phase 2, an additional body
had been created to broaden representation in
decision-making. The eight “cluster coordinators,” who performed administrative functions
for their respective cluster teams, began meeting
separately among themselves to provide input to
the coordinating committee.

science-based analysis and advice, as well as
technical assistance, to cluster partners;

Although the initiative remained largely foundation-driven at the end of its first phase, there was
by that time more robust buy-in from the cluster
organizations, as indicated by a survey conducted
by the evaluators, and those organizations were
developing greater capacities in water-quality
monitoring, the use of watershed models, and
other techniques associated with a more science-based approach. This suggests that cluster
organizations were becoming more willing and
able to assume leadership roles. But additional
progress was needed to develop a management
structure that could truly be described as bottom-up. Urging the DRWI partners to begin
planning for the initiative’s long-term future, the
evaluators noted that grantee ownership of the
initiative would be essential if the DRWI was to
have any hope of persisting beyond the foundation’s 10-year time horizon. A committee known
as the “initiative stewards,” composed mostly of
representatives from the coordinating committee and the cluster coordinators, was formed to
begin thinking about how the initiative could
survive in the long term with less dependence on
the foundation.

• the NFWF, which administered a capital fund for restoring targeted lands and
provided technical assistance to cluster partners; and
• the ICL, which helped facilitate effective
collaboration among the DRWI partners.
By early 2016 the foundation had empowered the
committee to assume responsibility for managing
the theory of change process and, the following
year, to lead in the development of Phase 2 guidelines. Meanwhile, foundation staff members had
reduced their decision-making role, eventually
casting themselves as advisors to the coordinating committee rather than full members.
Although the foundation had ceded much
authority to the coordinating committee, further devolution of management control required
more participation from the cluster teams, a
92 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Toward Greater Grantee Empowerment

The foundation set out to change the way its
grantees operated by coordinating their work
around a science-informed strategy while at the
same time hoping to organize the DRWI as a
bottom-up initiative. This was a contradiction,
at least in the early stages, when grantees were
often leery about the new demands being placed
on them. It was not unreasonable to expect,
however, that greater decision-making authority
could be transferred to the grantee community
over time. To some extent this has happened
— first, with the increased empowerment of
coordinating committee and, more recently,
with the elevated role of the cluster coordinators.

Balancing the Competing Demands of Strategic Philanthropy

Strategic Focus Versus
Opportunistic Flexibility
Among the most important strategic decisions
for a grantmaker is the extent to which grant dollars should be concentrated on one or a few issue
areas. A highly focused grantmaking strategy
improves the odds that resources will be concentrated enough to make a meaningful difference
and produce observable impacts. Conversely, a
high level of focus restricts options and may foreclose chances to take advantage of unanticipated
opportunities as they arise.

Geographical targeting was built into the DRWI
from the outset when the foundation decided to
concentrate activities within eight cluster areas.
But even those areas were large, diverse landscapes. In the expectation that concentrating
capital projects geographically would increase
the likelihood of measurable impacts, the cluster
teams were asked to locate land protection and
restoration projects within much smaller focus
areas. In Phase 1, however, most of those focus
areas were far too large to encourage meaningful
spatial aggregation of projects, and there was little consistency in the way they had been defined
from one cluster to the next.
Although this was the view of the coordinating committee, it was not shared by many local
implementing organizations. In a survey of cluster team members conducted by the evaluators

in January 2017, less than half of the respondents
(44%) agreed that “capital projects should be concentrated within relatively small areas,” and only
5% thought that “the focus areas defined for my
cluster in the Phase 1 implementation plan were
too large.”
The evaluators called attention to the stark contrast in thinking about focus areas and urged the
DRWI partners to develop a new approach that
would help concentrate projects while preserving the flexibility grantees needed to get projects
done. The nature and size of focus areas was a
major topic of discussion during the planning
year as Phase 2 guidelines were being developed.
Although the tension had not been fully resolved
by the end of the planning period, the initiative
had moved toward reasonable compromises. The
coordinating committee held fast to its insistence
on restricting the size of focus areas and basing
their locations on scientific criteria using models
of small watersheds developed for that purpose.
But they understood that the focus areas had to
be numerous enough to ensure sufficient project
opportunities, with the expectation that measurable results would be achieved in only a subset of
the targeted places. The OSI and the NFWF, the
two organizations managing the capital funds,
created incentives to encourage the aggregation
of capital projects. The NFWF decided to score
potential restoration projects higher if they were
located near other projects, and the OSI reduced
the match requirement for land-protection
The Foundation Review // 2019 Vol 11:4 93
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Strategic focus in the field of conservation often
takes the form of geographical targeting, where
the question is whether to limit interventions
to areas that are especially important, such as
biodiversity hotspots or aquifer recharge areas,
or to pursue a more opportunistic approach
(Martin, 2012). A degree of opportunistic flexibility is essential when strategies require the
cooperation of private landowners. Land trusts
are necessarily opportunistic because they can
close land deals only where owners are willing
to sell (Delfin & Tang, 2006). Similarly, watershed restoration projects and agricultural best
management practices often depend on the
willingness of landowners to collaborate with
conservation organizations.

The evaluators called attention
to the stark contrast in
thinking about focus areas
and urged the DRWI partners
to develop a new approach
that would help concentrate
projects while preserving the
flexibility grantees needed to
get projects done.

Wilson, Bromer, and LaRoche

Reflective Practice

[I]t took several years for the
foundation and its partners to
come to a shared understanding
of what the initiative could
reasonably expect to achieve
on its own, and what it could
aspire to accomplish in the long
run with the help of a wider
range of stakeholders.
projects near other protected land. If these incentives work as expected, concentrations of projects
will emerge through time in areas where restoration and land protection can make a difference
in water quality and where there happen to be
willing landowners.
The differing views on focus areas served as
a vivid illustration of the underlying tension
between strategic focus and opportunistic flexibility. Strategic considerations advocated by the
coordinating committee demanded that focus
areas be carefully chosen based on scientific
criteria and small enough that projects would be
spatially concentrated and cumulative impacts
could be achieved. Implementing organizations,
on the other hand, could conduct projects only
where there were willing landowners, so they
wanted to maximize project opportunities and
access to capital funding by creating large focus
areas. The new approach to focus areas worked
out in Phase 2 planning was a reasonable compromise, but its success in balancing the interests
of scientific planners and project implementers
remains to be demonstrated.

Ambitious Aspirations Versus
Realistic Expectations
The learning process the DRWI went through
in developing its strategy was not just a matter
1

TMDL is a regulatory term in the U.S. Clean Water Act.
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of finding effective ways to achieve the goals; at
least equally challenging was clarifying what the
goals should be. Early in the initiative the evaluators called attention to the confusion around
goal definition, but it took several years for the
foundation and its partners to come to a shared
understanding of what the initiative could reasonably expect to achieve on its own, and what it
could aspire to accomplish in the long run with
the help of a wider range of stakeholders.
The resistance to articulating clearer overall
goals stemmed in part from the foundation’s
desire to let the cluster teams formulate specific
goals for their local areas. In addition, many partners may have been reluctant to acknowledge the
limitations of a privately led watershed initiative.
Comparisons to the neighboring Chesapeake
Bay watershed, where the federal government
was much more active, were hard to avoid.
There, watershed improvement activities were
driven by the federally mandated Chesapeake
Bay Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL),1
which set specific targets for the reduction of
nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment entering
the bay. Efforts to achieve the TMDL targets
for the Chesapeake were backed by much more
generous state and federal resources and the
regulatory force of law. The initiative partners
rightly avoided setting comparable targets for
their own work, recognizing the limited size of
their projects and the fact that large-scale impacts
directly attributable to the initiative would be
unrealistic (Freedman, Ehrhart, & Hall, 2018).
Thanks to deliberations during the planning
year, it became clear that the outcomes the
DRWI was pursuing through its on-the-ground
projects were much more modest than those
being sought by the Chesapeake TMDL process.
Having agreed that cluster teams should try to
concentrate projects within relatively small focus
areas, and understanding that opportunities for
good projects would not be available in all focus
areas, initiative leaders now expected that cluster teams should seek demonstrable impacts in
a few small subwatersheds where conditions
and opportunities were favorable. That is, the
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emphasis would be placed on developing a few
good success stories within each cluster area.
Gone now was any fear that implementing
organizations would be expected to produce
outcomes that were far beyond their capacities.
But the new question was whether a few success
stories in scattered locations throughout the
basin would be enough to justify tens of millions of dollars in foundation investments. That
might seem like a meager payoff for an initiative
of this scale. What helped allay this concern was
a redoubled commitment to building upon and
complementing the on-the-ground project work
being supported through the DRWI.
The Direct and Indirect Strategies

Although land protection and restoration projects were the DRWI’s main emphasis, the
foundation also provided funding to local
organizations for “complementary activities”
– outreach, education, and advocacy aimed at
leveraging additional resources and enlisting
the cooperation of other actors whose decisions
affect the health of the watershed, particularly

local governments. During the first phase of the
initiative, however, the complementary activities
were unfocused and poorly coordinated with
on-the-ground projects.
The evaluation team raised questions about the
role of complementary activities in the DRWI,
suggesting that they should be receiving more
attention. To encourage discussion on this issue,
the evaluators proposed a simplified logic model
that identified two pathways toward desired
water-quality outcomes. (See Figure 3.) The
“direct pathway” consisted of on-the-ground
projects, which were expected to produce quantifiable outcomes in targeted subwatersheds (i.e.,
“success stories”). In the “indirect pathway,”
complementary activities were expected to stimulate increased efforts to improve water quality.
It was presumed that success stories would
contribute to these increased efforts through
“proof-of-concept effects” that would help catalyze additional activity. Together, the direct
and indirect pathways were expected to produce
water-quality outcomes on a scale larger than
The Foundation Review // 2019 Vol 11:4 95

Reflective Practice
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An important — often the most
important — contribution an
evaluation can make is to help
a foundation learn its strategy.

intended that the DRWI should rely solely on
the land protection and restoration projects.
Work with local governments and other complementary activities were included from the start.
During the first several years, however, partners
were intent on developing and implementing the
direct pathway while tending to overlook the
indirect pathway.

those that could be achieved by the initiative’s
on-the-ground strategies alone. Visualizing
the strategy in this way helped make the point
that by pursuing success stories of modest scale
through on-the-ground projects, the DRWI was
not abandoning more ambitious aspirations.
Rather, local success stories could be seen as
intermediate outcomes that would serve as steps
on the way toward longer-term outcomes on a
larger scale.

The distinction between the two pathways
toward the long-term outcomes reminded
partners that complementary activities were
important and deserved more attention. It also
made explicit the role on-the-ground projects
were expected to play in the initiative’s overall
strategy; their purpose was not so much to yield
large-scale impacts as to demonstrate what could
be accomplished if more resources were invested
in restoration and protection projects guided
by sound science. This, in effect, helped relieve
the burden on project-implementing organizations, making it clear that they were expected
to produce some impressive success stories, not
to achieve unrealistically large water-quality
impacts.

In preparation for Phase 2, the coordinating
committee developed guidelines designed to
encourage a more strategic approach to the indirect pathway. Ideally, complementary activities
would be concentrated within focus areas that
had been targeted for land protection and restoration projects. Since local governments in
the region vary widely in respect to their willingness and capacity to address water-quality
challenges, however, there was no guarantee
that high-priority municipalities would be receptive to working with the DRWI partners. Again
confronting the need to allow implementing
organizations the flexibility needed to respond
to local opportunities, the coordinating committee decided to encourage rather than require
greater alignment between focus areas and
local government engagement. A complementary-strategy steering committee was created
to help cluster teams develop more strategic
approaches to working with local governments
and other key stakeholders.
Relieving the Burden on Project Implementers

The initiative’s challenges in defining clear goals
and expectations were rooted in an apparent
mismatch between the foundation’s ambitious
aspirations and the limits of an initiative that
emphasized privately funded, voluntary, on-theground projects. But the foundation never
96 The Foundation Review // thefoundationreview.org

Conclusions
The role of evaluation in strategic philanthropy
is typically seen as something like the feedback system of a self-driving car: a destination
is set, the feedback system monitors progress
toward the end-point, and when obstacles are
detected the system directs corrective actions
to be taken. This model assumes the goal and
the path toward it are known in advance and are
independent of the evaluation. In our experience,
evaluations of complex initiatives, especially
those that begin during the early stages, cannot
simply take the aims as given. The challenge is
not so much to measure progress toward goals as
to clarify what the program is trying to achieve
and how it intends to achieve it. An important
— often the most important — contribution an
evaluation can make is to help a foundation learn
its strategy.
The DRWI evaluation was originally conceived
as a way to gauge progress toward the initiative’s
goals, but the evaluators quickly discovered that
such an assessment could not occur until the
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The evaluators’ role was not to provide answers
to such questions, but to continually raise them
— to act as Socratic interrogators drawing
attention to ambiguities and contradictions and
encouraging participants to address them. While
the tensions have not been entirely eliminated,
the initiative has made substantial progress
in managing them. In the areas of planning,
management, geographical targeting, and goal
setting, the experts and implementers have negotiated with each other to reach compromises
and mutually agreed solutions. As the initiative
began its second phase, partners were much
more confident in the strategic approach and
organizational arrangements than they were at
the outset.

The evaluators’ role was not
to provide answers to such
questions, but to continually
raise them — to act as
Socratic interrogators drawing
attention to ambiguities and
contradictions and encouraging
participants to address them.
must confront the underlying conflict between
rational strategizing and respect for grantees’ autonomy. They must set goals that are
appropriately ambitious without creating unrealistic expectations for their grantees. They
must develop planning processes and management structures that weigh foundation-driven
strategizing against the need to learn from grantees and their experiences in the field. They must
develop approaches that are focused enough to
produce concrete results while allowing grantees
the flexibility needed to respond to unanticipated
opportunities. Each initiative will need to go
through its own learning process to find ways to
deal with the resulting challenges, and evaluators can be important partners in this process.

Although this article has described tensions
unique to the DRWI, all strategic grantmakers
The Foundation Review // 2019 Vol 11:4 97
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foundation and its partners addressed and clarified key questions stemming from the central
dilemma of strategic philanthropy: the desire
for a rational, evidence-based strategy capable of
producing measurable outcomes, and the competing need to respect grantees’ local knowledge
and give them the leeway they need to get the
work done. The foundation struggled to balance these two demands from the outset, but
in the early stages of the initiative neither it nor
its grantees were clear on how to do that. The
balancing act had to be learned. Partners had
to come up with workable solutions to a range
of perplexing problems: What sort of planning
process could best combine a comprehensive,
basinwide approach informed by scientific
experts with local-level planning by implementing organizations? What kind of organizational
structure could provide overall coordination
and expert guidance while allowing an appropriate level of input from local grantees? Could
geographical focus areas be selected in such a
way as to direct project resources to locations
where they would be most likely to make a difference, while at the same time giving project
implementers enough flexibility to respond to
opportunities? Could partners agree on goals
that were ambitious enough to justify a large
foundation investment without creating unrealistic expectations for grantees?
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